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could be imposed for .conditions on property not owned by 
or under defendant's control. 
In view of the foregoing it cannot fairly be said that the 
error, if any, in giving the instruction complained of, was 
prejudicial, and the judgment should, therefore, be affirmed. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied July 24, 
1952. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should 
be granted. 
[L. A. No. 22166. In Bank. June 30, 1952.] 
OLIVER 0. CLARK, Petitioner, v. STATE BAR OF 
CALIFORNIA, Respondent. 
[1] Attorneys-Disciplinary Proceedings-Review.-In a discipli-
nary proceeding against an attorney, findings of fact by local 
administrative committee and board of governors are not bind-
ing on the Supreme Court, which can pass on the sufficiency 
and weight of the evidence. 
[2] !d.-Disciplinary Proceedings-Review-Burden of Proof.-
Although Supreme Court is not bound by findings of local 
administrative committee and of Board of Governors of State 
Bar in a disciplinary proceeding, a petitioner seeking review 
of the board's recommendation has the burden of showing 
that it is erroneous or unlawful. 
[3] !d.-Disciplinary Proceedings-Relationship of Parties.-Fact 
that an attorney and an incompetent person occupied the 
relation of guardian and ward, and not that of attorney and 
client, does not preclude disciplinary action against the at-
torney for mishandling the assets of the incompetent per-
son's estate. 
[ 4] Guardian and Ward- Powers and Duties of Guardian.- A 
guardian of an incompetent person occupies a ,position de-
manding of him the highest degree of diligence and good 
faith. {Prob. Code, § 1400.) 
[1] See Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. (1949 Rev.), Practice of Law,§ 104. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Attorneys, § 174; [2] Attorneys, 
§ 175; [3, 6] Attorneys, § 136; [4] Guardian and Ward, §55; 
[5] Guardian and Ward, §1; [7,8] Attorneys, §27; [9,10,12,13] 
Attorneys, § 140; [11, 14, 18] Attorneys, § 172(9); [15, 16, 20] At-
torneys, § 139; [17] Guardian and Ward, § 95; [19] Guardian 
and Ward, § 93; [21] Attorneys, § 137. 
39 C.2d-6 
162 [39 C.2d 
[5] !d.-Nature of Office.-A guardian is an officer of the court 
until discharged from his guardianship. 
[6] Attorneys-Disciplinary Proceedings-Relationship of Parties. 
-When an attorney assumes a fiduciary relationship and 
violates his duty in a manner that would justify disciplinary 
action if the relationship had been that of attorney and client, 
he may properly be disciplined for his misconduct. (Bus. & 
Prof. Code, § 6106.) 
[7] Id.-Duties.-As a fiduciary, the law imposes on an attorney 
the strictest duty of prudent conduct. 
[8] Id.-Duties.-An attorney must perform his duties to the 
best of his individual ability. 
[9] !d.-Disciplinary Proceedings-Commingling Trust and Indi-
vidual Funds.-Commingling of trust and individual funds 
is committed when a client's money is intermingled with that 
of his attorney and its separate identity lost so that it may 
be used for the attorney's personal expenses or subjected to 
claims of his creditors. 
[10] !d.-Disciplinary Proceedings-Commingling Trust and Indi-
vidual Funds.-When a client's money is kept apart from 
that of his attorney, rule 9 of the Rules of Professional Con-
duct ( 33 Cal.2d 30), declaring that a member of the State 
Bar shall not commingle the money or property of a client 
with his own, is not violated. 
[11] !d.-Disciplinary Proceedings-Evidence-Commingling Trust 
and Individual Funds.-Notwithstanding evidence showing 
that an attorney as guardian sold his ward's property for 
cash and failed to deposit the money in· the guardianship 
account, the Supreme Court, in view of the seriousness of 
the charge and the lack of direct evidence of commingling, 
accepted as true the attorney's testimony that he placed the 
money in his safe in a large envelope marked "Bigelow Es-
tate." 
[12] !d.-Disciplinary Proceedings-Commingling Trust and In-
dividual Funds.-Rule against commingling of a client's money 
with an attorney's own money was adopted to provide against 
the danger that such commingling will result in loss of the 
client's money; moral turpitude is not necessarily involved. 
[13] !d.-Disciplinary Proceedings-Commingling Trust and Indi-
vidual Funds.-Although an attorney may properly place his 
ward's money in his safe for a short period of time to safe-
guard it until he has time to deposit it in a bank, when he 
keeps a large sum of his ward's money in his safe for over 
three years and loses track of its whereabouts, he is guilty 
of gross negligence in the handling of his ward's funds. 
[14] Id.- Disciplinary Proceedings- Evidence- Misconduct To-
ward Court.-Evidence sustains conclusion of Board of Gov-
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ernors of State Bar that an attorney failed to include a desig-
nated sum in his guardianship accounting to the court and 
that such omission was intentional and wilful where the only 
reference by which such money could be traced is an entry 
under "Accounts Receivable," without giving the name of the 
debtor or debtors of the estate; the account fails to reveal 
that part of this money was in the attorney's possession and 
not deposited in the bank; and the circumstances indicate 
that the entry was made to make the books balance and to 
conceal the fact that his gross negligence had caused him to 
lose track of a large sum of his ward's money. 
[15] Id.- Disciplinary Proceedings- Withdrawals as Guardian 
Tees Without Court Approval.-An attorney was not guilty 
of misconduct in making withdrawals from a ward's estate 
as guardian fees without prior court approval where, at the 
time such withdrawals were made, a guardianship fee could 
be claimed as an item of an account and paid as such with-
out the formality of a petition to the superior court and a 
special order or decree, subject to the condition that the 
amount of such withdrawal found by the court to be excessive 
must be returned to the estate. 
[16] !d.-Disciplinary Proceedings-Misconduct Toward Court.-
An attorney is not guilty of having intentionally misled the 
superior court by not expressly revealing to it that the money 
in his safe belonged to a guardianship estate where he was 
never directly asked whether such money was his money or 
guardianship moncv. 
[17] Guardian and Ward-Guardian's Accounts.-A guardian does 
not comply with Frob. Code, § 1553, relating to accounts, 
when he presents an account so inaccurate that investigation 
by a referee becomes necessary. 
[18] Attorneys-Disciplinary Proceedings-Evidence-Filing In-
accurate Guardian's Accounts.-Finding of Board of Gover-
nors of State Bar that attorney failed to file within a reason-
able time or until ordered by the court, an account as guardian 
of an incompetent person's estate, and that the account filed 
was incomplete, inaccurate and misleading, is sustained 
by evidence that he admitted his negligence and that he 
completely lost track of a large sum of money realized from 
a real estate transaction for "about three and a half years," 
and that he submitted the account without any attempt to 
ascertain if it had revealed the true state of affairs. 
[19] Guardian and Ward-Guardian's Accounts.-A guardian may 
properly employ an accountant to perform acts involving 
professional skills not possessed by the guardian, but he may 
not delegate all responsibility. 
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[20] Attorneys- Disciplinary Proceedings- Misconduct Toward 
Court.-Presentation to court of an account which an attor-
ney knew to be misleading is a ground for disciplinary action. 
(Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068(6).) 
[21] !d.-Disciplinary Proceedings-Violation of Oath and Duties 
as Attorney.-Gross negligence is a breach of the fiduciary 
relationship that binds an attorney to the most conscientious 
fidelity to the interests of his client; it warrants disciplinary 
action, since it is a violation of his oath to discharge his 
duties to the best of his knowledge and ability. (Bus. & 
Prof. Code, §§ 6067, 6103.) 
PROCEEDING to review a recommendation of suspension 
of an attorney for one year. Petitioner suspended for six 
months. 
John W. Preston for Petitioner. 
Edward Hervey and Jerold E. Weil for Respondent. 
THE COURT.-Petitioner Oliver 0. Clark is charged in 
six counts with violation of his oath and duties as an attor-
ney (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 6067, 6103), with violation of 
rule 9 of the Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar 
of California (commingling of funds), and with commission 
of acts involving moral turpitude and dishonesty. (Bus. & 
Prof. Code, § 6106.) After a hearing, the local administra-
tive committee found, except as to Counts One and Five, that 
the acts alleged to have been committed or omitted were in 
fact committed or omitted. The committee found, however, 
that there was no intentional commission or omission, that 
petitioner was simply guilty of ''oversight,'' ''carelessness,'' 
and "neglect," and recommended that the matter be dis-
missed. The Board of Governors of the State Bar held a 
hearing at which petitioner addressed the board and answered 
questions. The board admitted in evidence a letter submitted 
by petitioner, reviewed the record before the local adminis-
trative committee, and found petitioner guilty as charged 
on all six counts. The board recommended that petitioner 
be suspended from the practice of la~ for a period of one 
year. Three members dissented on the ground that the de-
gree of discipline recommended was insufficient. In fixing 
the degree of discipline to be recommended, the board took 
into consideration petitioner's past record, which included 
a disciplinary proceeding entitled "L.A. 1276-In the Mat-
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ter of Oliver 0. Clark, Attorney at Law (Dr. L. C. Bur-
well, complaining witness),'' in which the board on August 
5, 1949, publicly reproved petitioner. · 
Petitioner contends that there is no evidence to support 
the findings of the board. [1] The findings of fact by the 
local administrative committee and the board are not bind-
ing upon this court, and upon review of a recommendation 
for suspension or disbarment we pass upon the sufficiency 
and weight of the evidence. (Fleming v. State Bar, 38 Cal. 
2d 341, 342 [239 P.2d 866] ; Fall v. State Bar, 25 Cal.2d 149, 
159 [153 P.2d 1] .) [2] The burden is on petitioner, how-
ever, to show that the recommendation of the board is er-
roneous or unlawful. (Alkow v. State Bar, 38 Cal.2d 257, 
258 [239 P.2d 871].) 
The six counts in this proceeding all arise from petitioner's 
conduct as guardian of the estate of one George W. Bigelow, 
an incompetent. Petitioner was appointed guardian on Au-
gust 30, 1943, and continued in that capacity until the death 
of his ward, December 21, 1948. Petitioner was subsequently 
appointed executor of Bigelow's estate. 
Petitioner filed his first annual account on December 16, 
1944, and the account was approved by the court. There-
after no accounts were filed, and on April13, 1948, the surety 
on petitioner's bonds petitioned the court for an accounting. 
Petitioner thereafter filed his second account on July 28, 
1948, which was not approved. An amended second account 
was filed on November 22, 1948, but was ordered off calendar 
following Bigelow's death. On March 1, 1949, petitioner 
filed a final account, approval of which was denied by the 
court with instructions to file a new account for the entire 
period of the guardianship. On May 23, 1949, a certified 
public accountant was appointed as a referee to examine 
petitioner's records. On August 29, 1949, the referee re-
ported a cash shortage of $2,131.12 in the guardianship funds. 
'rhe court found that petitioner had overcompensated him-
self and the estate's attorney (petitioner's son-in-law), and 
had made other unauthorized expenditures, totalling $5,145. 
The court also ordered petitioner to bear the costs of ap-
pointing the referee, $1,100. Petitioner was thus surcharged 
for the cash shortage of $2,131.12, the unauthorized expendi-
tures of $5,145, and the costs of appointing the referee, $1,100, 
or a total of $8,376.12. The final account was approved on 
that basis. The amount surcharged was repaid by petitioner 
and not by the bonding company. 
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[3] It should be noted at the outset that the fact that 
petitioner and Bigelow occupied the relationship of guardian 
and ward, and not that of attorney and client, would not 
preclude disciplinary action. [4] .As guardian petitioner 
occupied a position demanding of him the highest degree 
of diligence and good faith. (Prob. Code, § 1400; Guardian-
ship of Carlon, 43 Cal..App.2d 204, 208 [110 P.2d 488] .) 
[5] He was an officer of the court until discharged from 
his guardianship. ( G~wrdianship of Reynolds, 60 Cal..App. 
2d 669, 677 [141 P.2d 498] .) He took an oath that he 
would execute the duties of his trust. (Prob. Code, § 1480.) 
['6] When an attorney assumes a fiduciary relationship and 
violates his duty in a manner that would justify disciplinary 
action if the relationship had been that of attorney and 
client, he may properly be disciplined for his misconduct. 
(Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6106; Petersen v. State Bar, 21 Cal.2d 
866, 870 [136 P.2d 561] ; Flaherty v. State Bar, 16 Cal.2d 
483, 489 [106 P.2d 617] ; Lyders v. State Ba1·, 12 Cal.2d 261, 
265 [83 P.2d 500] ; Jacobs v. State Bar, 219 Cal. 59, 64 [25 
P.2d 401]; see 7 C.J.S., .Attorney and Client, § 19.) 
Count One. The board found that petitioner "commingled 
money belonging to George W. Bigelow, an incompetent 
person, with his own money or personal effects.'' The money 
referred to, at least $1,400, was received by petitioner in May, 
1946, after sale of a lot owned by the ward. .After the referee 
completed his audit and reported a discrepancy in the guard-
ianship accounts, petitioner produced the money. .According 
to petitioner, the money, in fifty and hundred dollar bills, 
had been placed in a large envelope with the words ''Bigelow 
Estate" in pencil across the front. The envelope was placed 
in a locked metal box in petitioner's office, which also contained 
documents and money of clients in separately marked en-
velopes and petitioner's own money and documents. Petitioner 
did not have a personal bank account. The envelope remained 
in the box, and the money was not deposited in the guardian-
ship account for Bigelow. Petitioner explains his failure 
to deposit the money on the ground that he forgot to leave 
his secretary a memorandum instructing her to deposit the 
funds and that the money remained in the box for over three 
years through his oversight. He states that he found the 
missing money ''after the report of the referee in this matter, 
approximately two weeks later when it became plain to me 
that the discrepancy was due to the accounting of the money 
received from the Maywood lot.'' 
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Petitioner's explanation does not set at rest suspicions 
aroused by his conduct. He was requested to produce the 
envelope in which he stated that the money was placed, but 
did not do so. He did not call his secretary as a witness 
to corroborate his testimony. He could not account at the hear-
ing for the amount of money that he allegedly found in the 
envelope, yet he knew when he found the money that he was 
under investigation, that a shortage had been discovered in 
his accounts, and that he would undoubtedly be called upon 
to show that he had not misappropriated the missing money. 
These facts must be viewed in the light of petitioner's 
background. [7] As a fiduciary, the law imposed upon him 
the strictest duty of prudent conduct. Petitioner has practiced 
law in California since 1907. Because he is a man of superior 
intellect and wide experience, 1 his conduct is less excusable 
than might otherwise be the case. [8] An attorney ''must 
perform his duties to the best of his individual ability." 
(Friday v. State Bar, 23 Cal.2d 501, 505 [144 P.2d 564].) 
Against petitioner's version of the facts, we must balance 
evidence definitely showing that petitioner sold his ward's 
property for cash, that he failed to deposit the money in the 
guardianship account, that over three years later a referee's 
report divulged a shortage in funds, that the court and surety 
demanded that petitioner make up the shortage, and that 
then, but only then, petitioner produced the missing money 
with an explanation that tests credulity. 
The board contends that petitioner's testimony establishes 
commingling on the theory that the offense was committed 
when petitioner placed the envelope containing his ward's 
money in the same safe with his own money. [9] Rule 92 of 
the Rules of Professional Conduct (33 Ca1.2d 30) does not 
define commingling, but the decisions establish that com-
1The record contains a letter from .John W. Preston, formerly a mem-
ber of this court, stating: "I think I can fairly appraise the mental 
make-up of Mr_ Clark. He is in many respects a unique character- He 
has a trip hammer intellect and a superior power of expression. He is 
dynamic and overflowing with energy :filled witl1 hopeful enthusiasm_ 
He is a sound lawyer of very wide experience. He daily overschedules 
himself and as a consequence oftentimes omits or neglects material acts. 
But he is not dishonest. On the contrary, he is thoughtful and consid-
erate of the rights of others. If he could he would redeem every 
pledge he has made_" 
2
' 'A member of the State Bar shall not commingle the money or other 
property of a client with his own; and he shall promptly report to the 
client the receipt by him of all money and other property belonging 
to such client.'' 
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mingling is committed when a client's money is intermingled 
with that of his attorney and its separate identity lost so 
that it may be used for the attorney's personal expenses or 
subjected to claims of his creditors. (Bennett v. State Bar, 
27 Cal.2d 31, 36 [162 P.2d 5]; Griffith v. State Bar, 26 Cal.2d 
273, 276-277 [158 P.2d 1] ; Narlian v. State Bar, 21 Cal.2d 
876, 884-885 [136 P.2d 553]; Peck v. State Bar, 217 Cal. 47, 
51 [17 P.2d 112].) [10] When the client's money is kept 
apart from that of the attorney, rule 9 is not violated. (Town-
send v. State Bar, 36 Cal.2d 631, 633 [226 P.2d 581] .) Ac-
cordingly, if petitioner at all times kept his ward's money 
in a separate envelope in his safe, with his ward's name 
plainly marked on the envelope, the money was not commingled 
with petitioner's own money, within the meaning of rule 9. 
[11] Whether or not the charge of commingling can 
be sustained thus depends on whether or not we accept as 
true petitioner's testimony that he placed the money in his 
safe in a large envelope marked ''Bigelow Estate.'' In view 
of the seriousness of the alleged offense and the lack of direct 
evidence of commingling, we have decided, as did the local 
committee, to give petitioner the benefit of doubts that might 
reasonably be entertained as to his credibility, and to accept 
his testimony as true. We therefore conclude that the charge 
of commingling has not been proved. 
Even though the offense of commingling was technically 
not committed, many of the dangers that accompany violation 
of rule 9 are present here. [12] The rule against com-
mingling "was adopted to provide against the probability in 
some cases, the possibility in many cases, and the danger 
in all cases that such commingling will result in the loss 
of clients' money. Moral turpitude is not necessarily involved 
in the commingling of a client's money with an attorney's 
own money if the client's money is not endangered by such 
procedure and is always available to him. However, inherently 
there is danger in such practice for frequently unforeseen 
circumstances arise jeopardizing the safety of the client's 
funds, and as far as the client is concerned the result is the 
same whether his money is deliberately misappropriated by 
an attorney or is unintentionally lost by circumstances beyond 
the control of the attorney." (Peck v. State Bar, 217 Cal. 47, 
51 [17 P.2d 112].) [13] Of course, an attorney may prop-
erly place his ward's money in his safe for a short period 
of time to safeguard it until he has time to deposit it in a bank. 
But when an attorney keeps a large sum of his ward's money 
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in his safe .for over three years and loses track of its where-
abouts, the evils described in the Peck case are clearly present. 
Petitioner, according to his own ·version of the facts, was 
guilty of gross negligence in the handling of his ward's funds. 
[14] Cot{nt Two. The board found that petitioner failed 
''to include the sum of $1,851.29 in his accounting to the 
court, and that said omission was intentional and wilful.'' 
The sum referred to is the money that petitioner stated that 
he found in the envelope shortly after the report of the 
referee. Of this sum, at least $1,400 was from the real estate 
transaction referred to in Count One. Petitioner stated at 
the hearing that he did not know the source of the balance of 
the money, but the report of the referee indicates that the 
money was derived either from the sale of the real property 
or from the sale of 18 shares of stock that belonged to the 
ward. The record contains petitioner's "Complete and Final 
Account of Guardian for Full Period of Guardianship-
August 30, 1943 to December 22, 1948," filed on March 1, 
1949. In his listing of estate assets, the only reference 
by which the money in question could be traced is an entry, 
"Accounts Receivable, $1,788.02." There is no further ex-
planation of this entry, and the name of the debtor or debtors 
of the estate is not given. 'fhe only entries under ''Total 
Cash" are deposits in three guardianship accounts totalling 
$4,430.28. In another part of the account, under the title 
''Monies Received During Guardianship,'' petitioner lists 
"net from sale of lot and water shares, $3,788.02. " 2a 
The account thus states the amount for which the ward's 
property was sold, but fails to reveal that part of this money 
was in the possession of petitioner and not deposited in the 
bank. If petitioner knew at the time he filed his final account 
in March, 1949, that the money had not been deposited in the 
bank, his defense to the charge of commingling, that he did 
not know the money had not been deposited until after the 
report of the referee in August, 1949, could not be true. If 
it is not true, and petitioner knew that the money had not 
••The amount of the shortage, $1,851.29, differs from the amount for 
which the ward's property was sold because $2,000 of the money re· 
ceived from the sale was paid immediately to the nurse that cared for 
the ward. From the referee's report it appears that the other $1,788.02 
was placed in the envelope. The record does not disclose the source of 
the remaining $63.27 in the envelope. Petitioner testified that he placed 
$1,400 of the money received from the sale in the euvelope. Under his 
version of the facts, he thus cannot account for $451.29 of the $1,851.29 
in the envelope. 
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been deposited, Count 'l.'wo is supported by the evidence, for 
it was petitioner's duty to disclose in his final account that 
he was the debtor for the amount entered under ''Accounts 
Receivable." (See Civ. Code, §§ 2228, 2229, 2233; Bone v. 
II ayes, 154 Cal. 759, 766 [99 P. 172] .) On the other hand, 
assuming, as we did under Count One, that petitioner was 
telling the truth when he told the administrative committee 
that he '' assunied always that the deposit had been made,' '3 
the evidence again supports Count Two. If the money had 
been deposited, it should have appeared in the account under 
''Total Cash'' deposited in the bank. What then could peti-
tioner have meant by his entry of $1,788.02 under ''Accounts 
Receivable''? When pressed for an explanation before the 
administrative committee, he stated, "I thought that the dif-
ference represented by that account receivable was a differ-
ence that had probably occurred in the transmission of monies 
from the general account of the guardian to the trustee ac-
count of Mrs. Gosman [the nurse who cared for the ward]." 
This explanation is unacceptable since the slightest investi-
gation would have revealed that the money was not in Mrs. 
Gosman's trustee account. If petitioner had lost track of 
the money, it was his duty to reveal that fact to the court. 
The entry of $1,788.02 under "Accounts Receivable," how-
ever, would naturally mislead the court into believing that 
that sum was due to the estate from some unnamed debtor, 
such as money due from the sale of the ward's property. We 
cannot escape the conclusion that the entry was made to make 
the books balance and conceal the fact that petitioner's gross 
negligence had caused him to lose track of a large sum of his 
ward's money.4 The finding of the board under Count Two 
thus has adequate support in the evidence. 
3In defending the charge of commingling, petitioner stated ''I as-
sumed always that the deposit had been made,'' and that he found the 
money in his safe "about two weeks" after the referee's report. The 
record, however, contains a letter written by petitioner to the referee 
on August 16, 1949, 13 days before the report, stating that the $1,788.02 
accounts receivable entry represents proceeds from the sale of the real 
property ''not deposited at the date of sale.'' 
•The account was actually prepared by one Ralph Ritchie, an accountant 
who, of course, could prepare the account only from data supplied by 
petitioner. Further, the account contained the following affidavit of 
petitioner: ''That he is the Guardian who makes the foregoing account 
and report; he has read the foregoing Complete and Final Account of 
Guardian for Full Period of Guardianship-August 30, 1943 to Decem-
ber 22, 1948; all the statements therein are true of his own knowledge, 
except as to those matters stated on information and belief and as to 
those matters he believes them to be true.'' 
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[15] Count TMee. 'fhe board found that petitioner "did 
without order or authorization of court withdraw as guardian 
fees on the dates and amounts as follows," listing nine with-
drawals between December, 1944, and December, 1947, amount-
ing to $3,350. Petitioner conceded that he made the with-
drawals as compensation without prior court approval, stat-
ing that "it was my understanding that in a guardianship 
matter, the guardian, subject to the approval of the court 
later, had the right to compensate himself reasonably from 
time to time out of the guardianship funds.'' 
Section 1556 of the Probate Code provided at the times 
involved in this proceeding that a guardian "shall have such 
compensation for his services as the court in which his ac-
counts are settled deems just and reasonable.'' In 1951 sec-
tion 1556 was amended. 5 Before this amendment it was held 
that the guardianship fee could be claimed as an item of 
account and paid as such without the formality of a petition 
to the superior court and a special order or decree. (Estate 
of Eaton, 38 CaLApp.2d 180, 184 [100 P.2d 813].) The ques-
tion whether guardianship fees were excessive could be deter-
mined upon settlement in the trial court of the guardian's 
account and reviewed upon appeal from the order settling the 
account. (Prob. Code, § 1630.) Petitioner, therefore, could 
compensate himself from the guardianship estate without prior 
court approval, subject to the condition that the amount 
thereof found by the court to be excessive must be returned to 
the estate. Of course, if the withdrawals were in bad faith, 
and were misappropriations of estate funds instead of com-
pensation, a different problem would be presented. The board 
does not contend that the withdrawals here were in bad faith. 
We conclude, therefore, that the third count is unsupported 
by the evidence. 
"''At any time after the filing of the inventory and appraisement, 
but not prior to the expiration of three months from the issuance of 
letters of guardianship, any guardian may petition the court for an 
order fixing and allowing his compensation for 'services rendered to that 
time .... Upon the hearing the court shall make an order allowing 
such compensation to the guardian for services rendered to the estate 
of his ward . . . as the court may deem proper, and compensation so 
allowed shall thereupon be charged to the estate of the ward." As 
amended section 1556 is substantially similar to Probate Code, section 
904, providing for allowance of commissions to executors and adminis-
trators. Under section 904 an executor or administrator is not entitled 
to his commissions until after court approval. (Estate of Jones, 166 
Cal. 147, 152 [135 P. 293]; see Estate of Carter, 132 Cal. 113, 114 
[64 :P, :J-23, 484]; In re Rose, SO Cal. 166, 180 [22 P. 86].) 
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Cottnt Four. The board found that petitioner, without 
prior authorization of the court, withdrew attorney's fees 
amounting to $1,300. Petitioner's son-in-law was the attor-
ney for the estate. The foregoing discussion regarding the 
third count is applicable here. ( Cf. Pro b. Code, § 1556.1, 
enacted in 1951.) 
[16] Count Five. The board found that on October 18, 
1949, petitioner testified before Judge Paonessa in the Supe-
rior Court of Los Angeles County and intentionally misled 
the court by not revealing that $1,800 in petitioner's safe 
belonged to the guardianship estate. The $1,800 referred to 
included the $1,400 involved in Count One and another $400 
that was apparently the proceeds from another sale of estate 
property. The testimony before Judge Paonessa is in the 
record. It there appears that counsel for the bonding com-
pany was allowed to question petitioner ''as to his ability to 
make up" the shortage in his accounts revealed by the ref-
eree's report. Petitioner said that "within three days I will 
pay it all in." He further stated that he had "other money" 
in his safe, "approximately $1800," and "when the Court 
makes the order, I will put in the full amount." Counsel for 
the surety replied, "I have had your word before, and I would 
rather have it before the Court, if it is possible.'' The charge 
in Count Five is based on the fact that petitioner did not 
expressly inform the court that the money in his safe belonged 
to the guardianship estate. The questions by the attorney for 
the surety, however, were directed only to the issue whether 
petitioner could repay the shortage in his accounts and thus 
relieve the surety of liability on its bond. Petitioner was never 
directly asked whether the money in the safe was his money 
or guardianship money. Accordingly, it cannot be said that 
petitioner intentionally misled the court, and the finding of 
the board does not have adequate support in the record. 
Count Six. The board found that petitioner failed "to 
file within a reasonable time, or at all, until ordered to do so 
by the court, an account as guardian of the estate of George 
W. Bigelow, that the account filed by respondent was incom-
plete, inaccurate, and misleading. That the failure of re-
spondent to file a proper account necessitated an independent 
audit to be made by the court; that said audit established that 
respondent did not entirely account for all moneys received 
and in possession of the respondent as guardian of the said 
estate." 
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Petitioner did not file an inventory and appraisement of 
the guardianship estate until April 6, 1949, more than five 
years after his appointment, although Probate Code, section 
1550, requires the inventory and appraisement to be filed 
within three months of the appointment. Petitioner concedes 
that he did not comply with section 1550, but claims that 
he complied with section 1553, providing that ''At the expira-
tion of a year from the time of his appointment, and as often 
thereafter as he may be required by the court, the guardian 
must present his account to the court for settlement and allow-
ance." After petitioner filed his first account in December, 
1944, more than one year after his appointment, he did not 
file an account until, following petition of his bonding com-
pany, he was cited to show cause why he should not file an 
accounting. Petitioner thereafter filed an unacceptable cur-
rent account and an unacceptable final account. It became 
necessary to appoint a referee to audit petitioner's records. 
[17] A guardian does not comply with section 1553 when 
he presents an account so inaccurate that investigation by a 
referee becomes necessary. (See Purdy v. Johnson, 174 Cal. 
521, 527 [163 P. 893] .) 
[18] The finding of the board is clearly supported by 
the evidence. Petitioner testified that ''I am not attempting 
to exculpate myself for being negligent, but I don't think 
it was gross negligence." We disagree. The money from 
the real estate transaction might never have been discovered 
without the investigation. Petitioner admitted that he com-
pletely lost track of the money for ''about three and a half 
years." Petitioner justified his conduct by testifying, "I 
know previously I have been asked if it didn't strike me as 
rather peculiar that my account should be $1,800, or any 
amount, less than what it ought to be, but, you see, I have 
never personally handled the matters of deposit of my monies 
or keeping of records. Always that has been done by some-
body else, and I am not an accountant and didn't presume 
to carry in my mind how much money the estate was supposed 
to have on hand. It is probably careless of me to have done 
that, but nevertheless that is the way the matter came to pass.'' 
[19] A guardian may properly employ an accountant to 
perform acts involving professional skills not possessed by 
the guardian, but he may not delegate all responsibility. (See 
Purdy v. Johnson, supra; Scott on Trusts, §§ 171.2, 172.) 
Petitioner had the duty to make a reasonable check .on the 
entries in the final account as prepared by the accountant. 
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The account contains his statement that he had read the 
account and that the statements therein were either true to 
his own knowledge or that upon information and belief he 
believed them to be true. But the account, described under 
Count Two, above, was confused and incoherent. His sub-
mission of the account to the court, without any attempt to 
ascertain if it had revealed the true state of affairs, signifi-
cantly demonstrates petitioner's general conception of his 
professional obligations. "The purpose of keeping proper 
books of account, vouchers, receipts, and checks is to be 
prepared to make proof of the honesty and fair dealing of 
attorneys when their actions are called into question, whether 
in litigation with their clients or in disciplinary proceedings 
and it is a part of their duty which accompanies the relation 
of attorney and client. The failure to keep proper books . . . 
is in itself a suspicious circumstance." (Matter of O'Neill, 
228 App.Div. 518, 520 [240 N.Y.S. 183]; see Bruns v. State 
Bar, 18 Cal.2d 667, 672 [117 P.2d 327] .) In filing an in-
complete, inaccurate, and misleading account petitioner was 
guilty of gross negligence in the performance of his duties 
as guardian and as an attorney. 
Discipline. A consideration of petitioner's conduct leads to 
the conclusion that this case reflects much more than the inno-
cent inadvertence of a busy attorney, which petitioner sug-
gests as an explanation justifying his actions. Petitioner in-
tentionally included a large sum of mo:p_ey in his final account 
to the court under an entry designed to mislead the court 
(Count Two), and he was guilty of acts of gross negligence 
in his performance of his duties as guardian. (Counts One 
and Six.) [20] The presentation to the court of an account 
that petitioner knew to be misleading was a ground for dis-
ciplinary action. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068(d); Pickering 
v. State Bar, 24 Cal.2d 141, 144-145 [148 P.2d 1].) [21] Gross 
negligence is a breach of the fiduciary relationship that binds 
an attorney to the most conscientious fidelity to the interests 
of his client. (Stephens v. State Bar, 19 Cal.2d 580, 583 
[122 P.2d 549]; Waterman v. State Bar, 8 Cal.2d 17, 20 [63 
P.2d 1133].) It warrants disciplinary action, since it is a 
violation of his oath to discharge his duties to the best of his 
knowledge and ability. (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 6067, 6103; 
Stephens v. State Bar, supra; Trusty v. State Bar, 16 Cal.2d 
550, 553 [107 P.2d 10]; Waterman v. State Bar, supra.) 
In determining the proper degree of discipline, petitioner's 
prior disciplinary record may be considered. (Herron v. 
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State Bar, 24 Cal.2d 53, 65 [147 P.2d 543] .) In arriving 
at its recommendation of a suspension for one year, the 
Board of Governors relied upon three counts (Three, Four 
and Five), which are not supported by the evidence, and 
upon Count One, which vvas proved in a lesser degree than 
that relied upon by the board. We have concluded that peti-
tioner will be sufficiently punished if he is suspended from 
the practice of law for six months. 
It is ordered that Oliver 0. Clark be suspended from the 
practice of law for a period of six months, commencing 30 
days after the filing of this opinion. 
CAR'l'ER, J.-I dissent. 
Although petitioner was charged with six separate counts 
of having violated his duties as an attorney, they all arose 
out of the same transaction, that is, his conduct as the 
guardian of the estate of George W. Bigelow, an incompetent. 
The local administrative committee found that his alleged 
misconduct amounted only to carelessness in handling and 
keeping records of the assets of the estate. The majority 
opinion determines that the third, fourth and :fifth counts 
are not supported by the evidence. Counts one, two and six 
are held to establish "gross negligence" on petitioner's part, 
thus justifying discipline. I do not agree with this holding 
for three reasons: (1) Negligence, ordinary or gross, is not 
a proper ground for disbarment or suspension of a member of 
the State Bar. (2) Even if it is, it must be negligent 
conduct of an attorney toward his client in handling the 
client's business. It does not apply where there is no attorney-
client relationship between the attorney and the one toward 
whom he is negligent as we have here. (3) The evidence does 
not establish gross negligence. 
On the first point I have previously expressed myself in 
Stephens v. State Bar, 19 Cal.2d 580, 585 [122 P.2d 549] ; 
Trusty v. State Bar, 16 Cal.2d 550, 554 [107 P.2d 10] and 
In re McKenna, 16 Cal.2d 610, 612 [107 P.2d 258]. In 
addition I wish to point out that negligence in the handling 
of his client's affairs is not grounds for disbarment of an 
attorney in a majority of the states. (See cases collected, 7 
C.J.S., Attorney and Client, § 23, p. 744; 5 Am.Jur., Attorneys 
at Law, § 268, p. 423.) 
The majority in this case goes a step further, however, 
which brings me to the second point. It holds that the at-
torney may be suspended when the negligence occurs while 
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he is acting in a capacity other than as an attorney; where he 
is negligent with respect to his dealings with a third party, 
not a client. In the instant case petitioner was the guardian 
of the estate of an incompetent. He was not the attorney for 
the estate or incompet'ent. The latter and petitioner had an 
attorney. It is true that a fiduciary relation exists between 
a guardian and his ward but his duty is only such as should 
be exercised by a man of ordinary prudence in the manage-
ment of his own business. (Estate of Wood, 159 Cal. 466 
[114 P. 992, 36 L.R.A.N.S. 252] ; Estate of Boyes, 151 Cal. 
143 [90 P. 454].) And it has been held that mismanagement 
of another trust estate is not ground for removal as guardian 
of the estate under consideration. (Heath v. Maddock, 81 
N.J.Eq. 469 [86 A. 945], affd. 82 N.J.Eq. 366 [91 A. 1069] .) 
Likewise an attorney should not be disbarred because, while 
acting as a guardian but not as attorney, he is guilty of mis-
management of his ward's estate. Because an attorney is a 
poor businessman in his dealings with another's property, 
of which he has control, but not as an attorney, should not be 
ground for disbarment and the majority opinion cites no case 
so holding. 
There are many ramifications to the rule stated by the 
majority. The husband is the manager of the community prop-
erty and he and his wife's relations are fiduciary. Would it 
be said that whenever the husband happens to be an attorney, 
a careless handling of the community property will be a 
ground for his discipline as an attorney 1 The majority would 
say that it could be. Likewise, the secretary or treasurer of 
a club or corporation is careless in keeping its records and 
handling its funds, may be disbarred if he is an attorney; 
an attorney who borrows an automobile from a friend, not 
a client, and his grossly negligent operation of it results in 
its destruction, is subject to disbarment; a guardian who is 
also an attorney but not for his ward's estate, is grossly neg-
ligent in the care of the property of his ward in an automo-
bile and it is consumed by fire, may be disbarred; an attor-
ney who is the guardian of the person of his ward but not as 
attorney, would be exonerated as to damages for any con-
duct, short of wilful misconduct or intoxication, in driving 
a vehicle causing injury to his ward, but he could be dis-
barred for such conduct. These and many more examples 
could be given which emphasize the vice of the holding of 
the majority opinion. The majority also point to the im-
practicability of requiring an attorney to be a superman, 
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not only in his relations with his clients, but also with third 
persons. 
Gross negligence conveys no connotation of intentional 
misconduct, wilfulness or intent to injure (Robertson v. 
Brown, 37 Cal.App.2d 189 [99 P.2d 288] ; Sumner v. Ed-
munds, 130 Cal.App. 770 [21 P.2d 159]; Meek v. Fowler, 
3 Cal.2d 420 [45 P.2d 194]; Browne v. Fernandez, 140 Cal. 
App .. 689 [36 P.2d 122]), but it is "the want of that care 
and diligence which even careless, thoughtless, or inattentive 
persons are accustomed to exercise; the failure to take such 
care as a person of common sense and reasonable skill in like 
business but of careless habits would observe in avoiding in-
jury to his own person or life under circumstances of equal 
or similar danger. It is very great negligence; negligence mate-
rially greater than ordinary negligence, the difference being 
one of degree, although sometimes it is said to be a difference 
of kind; negligence of an aggravated character; and gross 
failure to exercise proper care. The term implies a thought-
less disregard of consequences without exerting any effort 
to avoid them; an indifference to the things or welfare of 
others. It refers to conduct which is positive or affirmative 
rather than merely passive or negative." (65 C.J.S., Negli-
gence, § 8d, p. 370.) Here, as stated in my third point, the 
evidence was not sufficient to establish any intentional miscon-
duct nor gross negligence. 
On count one the board found petitioner guilty of com-
mingling funds where he placed the ward's money in a sepa-
rate envelope in his safe. The majority opinion correctly 
holds that there was no commingling of funds. The money 
was produced by petitioner from the envelope where it had 
been all the time. It had remained there three years but 
there was no showing of any misappropriation of it or intent 
to do so, and the ward was not injured by its being so kept. 
Yet the majority arrives at a finding of gross negligence 
because petitioner's explanation does not set at rest "suspi-
cions" and it "tests credulity," and that the evils inherent 
in commingling are present where petitioner keeps the money 
in his safe for three years and forgets its presence there. 
Disciplinary matters are not and should not be decided on 
"suspicions." The only evidence shows that the money was 
there at all times, was never misappropriated and was always 
a part of the ward's estate. If the money had been deposited 
in the bank in petitioner's name as guardian for three years 
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but was forgotten, it would not be called gross negligence. 
At most it would be ordinary negligence. 
The second count deals with a failure of petitioner to 
include some $1,800 in his accounting. That' was the same 
money that was in the envelope, and the same comments are 
applicable to it as were made with respect to the first count. 
Naturally he could not list it in the account if he had forgot-
ten about it. There is no proof of any intent to misappro-
priate it and it was not misappropriated. The inadvertent 
omission of one asset of a ward's estate from the guardian's 
account can hardly be said to constitute ordinary negligence, 
much less gross negligence. 
The sixth count deals with the failure to file an account 
as guardian until ordered by the court, and that the account 
filed was inaccurate and necessitated an independent audit. 
Petitioner did file an account after his appointment. If it 
was inaccurate, that was nothing more than negligence, as 
conceded by petitioner. It was not gross negligence. The 
account was filed and the ward was not injured. Certainly 
it cannot be said that such conduct constituted a failure to 
exercise the care a person of careless habits would exercise 
or gross negligence. 
In my opinion the record in this case does not disclose any 
conduct of petitioner which can be said to even remotely 
justify discipline, and I would therefore dismiss the pro-
ceeding against him. 
